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An examination of 45 FDIC sponsored bank mergers and 118 normal mergers 
occurring in the United States between 1982 and 1988 find no significant returns 
accrue to the shareholders of the acquiring bank.  This differs from earlier studies that 
find significant returns to acquired firm shareholders. 
 
Mergers in the Banking Industry 
 
The study of bank mergers is unique in several respects.  Banks operate in highly regulated 
environments, and federal and state banking regulations have placed restrictions on the number and 
types of banking mergers.  Deposit insurance agencies have also played a significant role with their 
concern for insolvent banks and for the solvency of any post merger entity.  The nature of their assets 
and liabilities also sets these mergers apart.  Most of a bank's liabilities are guaranteed, and as a result 
most of the uncertainty in valuation will be on the asset side.  Since good portions of their assets are 
financial, their valuation presents its own unique problems.  The estimation of these asset values is 
essentially different from that of firms with a large percentage of physical assets.  Finally, since it is 
politically difficult to allow banks to go bankrupt, insolvency will often lead to an acquisition.   
 
The empirical results are, in at least two respects, similar to the findings for non-bank mergers. 
 First, the target banks shareholders generally earn large and significant premiums (see: Trifts and 
Scanlon (1987), Baradwaj et al. (1990), Cornett and De (JBF 1991)), or Bertin, Ghazanfari and 
Torabzadeh (1989) (hereafter BGT).  Unlike non-bank mergers, however, both Cornett and De (JBF 
1991) and Baradwaj et al. (1990) conclude that cash mergers do not result in significantly larger 
premiums for the target firm.  The latter also conclude that, for mixed offers (both cash and stock), the 
premiums are smaller than for pure stock or cash transactions.  
 
The evidence for the acquirers is mixed.  James and Wier (JPE 1987) find significantly 
positive returns in two and four day windows around the announcement date.  They further determine 
that these returns are positively related to the number of alternate targets and a measure of the relative 
size of the acquired to the acquirer, and inversely related to the number of potential bidders.  Allen and 
Cebenoyan (1991) find positive bidder returns, but only to those firms that have a relatively high 
management stakes (as measured by manager holdings) or shareholder concentrations.  Cornett and De 
(JBF 1991) also find significant positive returns.  Emergency mergers are the only instances in which 
Sushka and Bendeck (1988) find positive merger premiums.  This conclusion, however, is based on 
only two mergers.  They also divide their sample into "internal" mergers, where the acquiring firm 
already has a significant stake in the target, and "external" mergers.  They conclude significant 
negative returns to the external group, and zero (insignificantly negative) returns to the internal 
mergers.  Their separation of the two groups may be questioned however, as an examination of their 
statistics reveals no significant difference in the abnormal returns between the two groups.  
 
Negative excess returns are earned by shareholders in bidder firms according to both Pettway 
and Trifts (1985) and Baradwaj et al. (1990).  Trifts and Scanlon (1987) conclude that large mergers 
(where the acquired bank is large compared with the acquiring bank) have no significant abnormal 
returns, while the returns to shareholders for small mergers are significantly negative.  Overall, it can 
be concluded that the returns to the acquirers are either zero or very small. 
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For insolvent banks, the FDIC often manages the resolution of their bankruptcy.  The manner 
in which this is conducted has resulted in the comparison of the process to an auction.  James and 
Wier (JME 1989) use auction theory to posit a negative relation between abnormal returns to the 
acquirer and the number of bidders.  They find that this relation is negative and significant for 
unassisted mergers, and that there is no significance between the two variables for FDIC auctions.  
The conclusion they draw from this result is that the FDIC procedure transfers wealth to the winning 
bidders.   
 
An alternate approach to that of James and Wier is found in Giliberto and Varaiya (1989).  
They compare the magnitude of the bids to several variables including the demand deposits of the 
failed bank (as a proxy for its asset base), the number of bidders (N), a measure of uncertainty of the 
failed bank value, and as well indicator variables to account for structural factors.  If these bids 
represent independent private valuations (IPV), the winning bid should increase with N, as the winner 
will not bid his valuation, but rather a value just above that of the second highest bidder.  However, for 
common valuation actions, the phenomenon known as the winner's curse would predict adjusted bids 
that decrease with the number of bidders.  Giliberto and Varaiya conclude from their results, since the 
magnitude of the bids appears to decrease as uncertainty increases and increase with the number of 
bidders, that these auctions are more appropriately described as IPVs. 
 
Some authors have attempted to determine the reasons why bank mergers occur and the source 
of value creation in bank mergers.  Rhoades (1986) concludes that poor managerial performance is not 
a motivation for these mergers.  Along with Hunter and Wall (1989), he maintains that the mergers do 
not usually purge the system of bad managers.  In their study, Beatty, Santomero and Smirlock (1987) 
draw three main conclusions.  Acquiring banks intend to change the portfolio composition of the target 
bank, they pay higher premiums for well-managed banks, and the shareholders of the target banks in 
non-competitive environments are paid higher premiums. 
 
Clark (1988) suggests that scale economies are possible for banks with less that $100 million 
in assets.  One might conclude that as many publicly traded banks are larger, this is not a major motive 
for those banks.  As Hunter and Wall also point out, given that the target bank's assets are less than 
$100 million, economies of scale may play a role.  They claim the evidence is that the cost curve is 
reasonably flat up to about $5 billion in assets.  Economies of scope may also be a motivation to 
acquiring banks that have need of core deposits.  In their study, Hunter and Wall conclude that the 
acquisition of core deposits is of value to acquiring banks. 
  The role of mergers in resolving bank failures has been the subject of a few studies.  James 
(1991), defines the loss realised in failed bank auctions as the difference between the book value of 
assets and the amount recovered by the FDIC net of direct expenses.  He measures this loss and then 
attempts to explain its magnitude using several variables.  Giliberto and Varaiya (1989) identify 
variables that could have an effect on the magnitude of the bid for failed banks.  In a study of P&A 
(purchase and acquisitions), Sushka and Bendeck conclude that emergency rescues are the only type of 
P&A that earns statistically significant positive returns for the acquiring bank.  However, this 
conclusion is made based on only two failed bank auctions.  Studies, by Pettway and Trifts (1985), 
James and Wier (JME 1987), and BGT have employed the traditional event study methodology to the 
stock returns of the shareholders of banks that acquire failed banks.   
 
Pettway and Trifts examine failed bank purchase and assumptions between 1972 and 1981.  
They use the geometric return and the market model, over a period of fifty trading days beginning 60 
days prior to the merger, to estimate a normal return.  They then determine the effect of the acquisition 
on the acquiring bank's shares.  The first of the three main conclusions that arise from this study is that 
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the market anticipates the merger, during the ten days before the event, with a significantly positive 
average increase in the acquiring firm's return (3.322%).  In the five days subsequent to the merger, 
the abnormal return of the banks also increases.  However, the final result is that over the longer term 
of fifty days following the merger, the return to the shareholders of the acquiring firms becomes 
negative (-6.747%).  They thus conclude that the market initially views the acquisition in a positive 
light, but later reevaluates that opinion (perhaps based on additional information) concluding that the 
transaction has become detrimental to the new entity. 
 
James and Wier (JME 1987) apply auction theory to failed bank acquisitions to reach the 
conclusion that there is a wealth transfer to the acquiring banks in FDIC auctions.  They examine 
nineteen P&A transactions, and 60 random bank acquisitions, between 1978 and 1983.  The 
announcement date in the Wall Street Journal determined the event date.  The periods -80 to -11 and 
11 to 80 relative to the event date were used to calculate the parameters of the market model.  
Significant and positive two-day abnormal returns were reported for the winners of the FDIC auctions 
(2.36%) and for the acquirers in the control group (1.07%).  For the abnormal returns of the banks 
engaged in FDIC auctions, the authors found that these returns were positively related to the ratio of 
the size of the acquired to the acquiring bank, and inversely related to the number of bidders 
participating in the auction. 
 
To further substantiate their wealth transfer hypothesis, they examine the relationship between 
the abnormal returns and variables for size, number of bidders, and number of alternate targets.  For 
the control sample, the results indicated a significant negative relationship between the log of the 
number of potential bidders and a significant positive relationship for the log of the number of 
alternate targets.  However for the FDIC sample, the relationships, though insignificant, are the reverse 
of the control sample.  Since the FDIC invites only a few bidders, the authors conclude that the FDIC 
method transfers wealth to the winning bidders.  They base this on their results that suggest that these 
acquirers earn significantly larger returns and that their returns are not related to the number of 
potential bidders or alternate targets. 
 
BTG (1989) examine 33 acquisitions of failed banks.  Using periods -121 to -21 relative to the 
announcement date, they estimate parameters for the market model.  Then they use these to calculate 
CARs for different event windows.  Significantly positive CARs are found for the windows -1 to 0, -1 
to +1, and -4 to 0.  Longer event windows were not statistically significant.  If there is a wealth 
transfer in FDIC failed bank auctions, it may result due to the nature of the deposit insurance business. 
 In a flat rate deposit insurance scheme, the insurance is relatively overpriced for the safest banks.  As 
well, participation as a bidder in FDIC auctions is by invitation.  Therefore, if only the safest banks are 
invited to participate, this wealth transfer could be viewed one possible form of reimbursement for the 
premium overpayment.  Alternatively, the difference between failed bank acquisitions and the control 
group may be a result of the new bank's systematic risk changing as a result of the merger.  It may be 
that the acquirers of failed bank assets are acquiring, on average, assets that are more risky relative to 
the assets acquired by the banks in the control group.  Then, the wealth transfer may be an appropriate 
compensation for the increased risk that the acquiring bank is assuming. 
 
The results as presented by Pettway and Trifts, James and Wier and BGT all indicate an 
initially positive evaluation by the market of the returns of banks acquiring failed institutions.  They 
differ, however, in their results of this evaluation in the longer term.  Those results are not significant. 
 With earlier data (pre 1982), Pettway & Trifts conclude overbidding by acquiring banks.  James and 
Wier and BGT, with samples from a later period, conclude that the process is characterized by 
underbidding.  However, they all failed to account for the possibility that the merger may have 
changed how investors perceive the riskiness of the firm.  It is likely that, in some of these 
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transactions, the relatively safe acquirer has merged with a more risky failed bank.  However, given 
elements of the FDIC failed bank auctions such as put back provisions and the withholding of more 
risky assets, it is possible that in some cases the assets transferred are less risky than those of the 
acquirer.  Thus, the shifting risk patterns may be hiding the true market reaction to the merger. 
 
Data and Methodology 
 
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's Annual Report contains information on banks 
closed during the year of the report because of financial difficulties.  This information includes the 
number of depositors, and dollar values of deposits and assets of the failed bank.  If the failed bank 
was merged with another institution, the acquirer, date of the merger and amount of FDIC 
disbursement if any are also reported.  An examination of these reports between 1982 and 1988 
uncovered a total of 69 failed bank mergers that involved acquirers with publicly traded shares.  These 
involved 33 acquiring banks.  Eliminating those transactions in which subsequent mergers are too 
close1, and accounting for instances in which an acquirer absorbed two banks on the same date, results 
in about 48 events that will be examined. 
 
A control group of bank mergers involving solvent banks, and therefore with no FDIC 
involvement was also collected.  The source of these mergers was the publication Mergers and 
Acquisitions between 1982 and 1988.  A subset was determined by eliminating all those that did not 
involve acquiring banks with publicly traded shares.  Then those cases in which the estimation period 
overlapped with other mergers were also eliminated, leaving 118 events that were examined. 
 
     1. Since this study uses sixty days pre merger and fifty days post merger, any merger that has 
another merger occurring in this window will be eliminated to avoid reporting results that may be 
contaminated with the existence of another event. 
The samples collected for the two groups was cross checked with information in the Wall 
Street Journal, Funk and Scott's Predicasts, and Mergers and Acquisitions to validate the information, 
and to detect the possible existence of other significant events that might influence the returns of the 
acquiring bank.  The data on bank returns was be obtained from the CRSP tapes and other sources for 
OTC traded shares. 
 
Failed bank mergers have a very short lead time between the announcement of the merger and 
the actual merger.  This short lead time is a result of the nature of the auction process for failed banks. 
 The event date, then, will be the date of the announcement by the FDIC.  The Wall Street Journal 
Index and Funk and Scott's will be examined for any indication of a prior announcement.  For the 
control group, the event date will be defined as the first date the intention to acquire was announced in 
either the Wall Street Journal Index or Funk and Scott's. 
 
 
Abnormal returns will be calculated with two alternate formulations that will use indicator 




where t represents a period 110 days around the event period including 60 days prior to the event and: 
R R I R I I et mt mt t= + + + +β β β β0 1 1 2 2 3 3
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Rt  is the return of the security in period t, 
Rmt  is the return of the market portfolio in period t, 
I1 is an indicator variable with a value of 1 during the post event estimation period and 
0 otherwise, 
I2 is an indicator variable with a value of 1 during the event period and 0 otherwise, 
I3 is an indicator variable with a value of 1 on the event date and for nine days before 
the event, and 
et is the error term. 
 
The alternate specification will calculate the abnormal returns in the following manner: 
 
where: 
Rt  is the return of the security in period t, 
Rmt  is the return of the market portfolio in period t, 
I1 is an indicator variable with a value of 1 during the pre event estimation period and 0 
otherwise, 
I2 is an indicator variable with a value of 1 on the event date and afterwards, and 0 
otherwise, 
I3 to 13 are indicator variables with a value of one on a unique day in the event window and 
zero otherwise, 
et is the error term. 
 
With this model, if the event day or date of the merger/FDIC announcement is day 0, then the other 
window days can be designated as day -5 to +5.  The event window is defined as that eleven day 
period including the event date, and five days before and five days after the event date.  It is possible 
to calculate a cumulative abnormal return for the event window by summing the estimated values of 
the indicator variables for the for the entire eleven day window as:  
 
The CAR for any smaller window can be calculated in a similar manner. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
For the first model, the abnormal return for the cumulative period of ten days up to and 
including the event period (t=-9 to t=0) is negative (an average daily return of -.030%) but 
insignificant (t=.440).  For the control group, it is positive (.048%), but as well insignificant (t=.746).  
A test for a difference in means between the two groups also leads to a result of insignificance 
(t=.745).  Therefore the conclusions that there are no significant abnormal returns to either group, and 
that there is no significant difference in the estimated abnormal returns to the two groups are 
supported. 
 
The results for the second model largely support the above.  For the control group, the average 
R R I R I I et mt mt i
i
i t= + + + +
=
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CAR-5,5 for all 48 events is .081%
2 (t=.088).  However, this result may be an anomaly, as it is not 
sustained and it does occur relatively early in the event window.  The control group has a cumulative 
eleven day return of .230% (t=.438), and is also insignificant.  All daily average abnormal returns and 
subgroupings of daily abnormal returns are insignificant at a 95% confidence level except day -5 for 
the control group.  It has an average daily return of .447% (t=2.355). 
 
These results are significant for several reasons.  First, the major findings of James and Wier 
(JME 1987) and BG&T (1989) are not replicated.  Both found statistically significant returns in a very 
narrow event window before the FDIC sponsored merger.  Part of this difference could be a result of 
the different samples.  James and Wier had a sample of 19 mergers from the period 1972 to 1981.  
These represent mergers that occurred in a period when intrastate bank mergers were more severely 
restricted.  The BGT sample more closely matches this study (1982 to 1987), but does contain 15 
fewer events and one less year (1988). 
 
BGT also uses a different estimation period for the model parameters.  They are in effect 
comparing the bank's merger performance with a premerger period.  It is conceivable that the riskiness 
of the new bank has increased, thus warranting an increased return to compensate for the increased 
risk.  This model does make such an adjustment.  James and Wier (JME 1987) do employ an 
estimation period that covers both the pre and post event periods (-80 to -10, and +10 to +80), but their 
smaller sample is from an earlier period. 
 
The results for the control sample also present different evidence.  James and Wier (JPE 1987) 
examine 60 acquisitions from 1972 to 1983.  They find small but significant 2 and 5 day average 
returns for bank mergers.  Again, the earlier time period for the sample could account for the differing 
results.  Also, their model for estimating the normal returns is similar to the model they employed with 
the failed banks, and different from the model employed in this study. 
 
     2 This is an eleven day return. 
In summary, the main conclusion of this paper is that both FDIC sponsored and regular bank 
mergers are zero net present value events during the period studied.  This result, seemingly at odds 
with prior studies, may have occurred for three reasons.  First, the period 1982 to 1988 represents a 
period in which there was a more open market with respect to intrastate bank mergers, thus potentially 
rendering the market for both failed and solvent acquisitions more competitive.  As well, the increase 
in the number of both types of bank mergers may have created a more competitive environment.  
Finally, the estimation technique employed allows for an adjustment in the market's perception of the 
risk of the newly created entity.  This is especially an important adjustment for banks acquiring failed 
banks. 
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